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T

he challenging and often conflicting forces of history, precedent,
colonization, self-determination, and the federal government’s trust
responsibility to Indian tribes make for many crossroads within the field
of federal Indian law. Scholars and practitioners have struggled with a
number of these intersections, including animal law in Indian Country, the ongoing
viability of precedent, protection of tribal sacred sites, and tribal–state relations.1
More recently, the expansion of tribal governmental capacity
and a corresponding desire to exercise greater tribal selfdetermination has run headlong into the federal government’s trust
responsibility, which is rooted in false and historical notions of Indian
incompetence.2 The conflict between tribal self-determination and
federal decision-making takes many forms, but one of the most
active and promising fields for the discussion of new approaches is
energy development on Indian lands. For many reasons, Congress,
President Barack Obama’s administration, and Indian tribes are now
intensely focused on how federal oversight of energy development
on tribal lands should be balanced with tribal self-determination.
This attention has prompted a number of different proposals, some
of which may lead to a fundamental redefinition of the federal–tribal
relationship. Thus, energy development on Indian lands is the
crucible for the latest Indian law crossroads, and, after describing the
history and factors that have contributed to the current discussion,
this article outlines pending administrative and legislative proposals,
one of which may represent the road forward to a new era of tribal
self-determination.3

Why a Crossroads?
As mentioned above, the conflict between tribal self-determination
and the trust responsibility is not confined to energy development
in Indian Country. For example, nearly 10 years ago and prior to
assuming his former post as assistant secretary for Indian Affairs,
Kevin Washburn succinctly described the basic conflict when writing
about tribal self-determination and federal criminal jurisdiction over
Indian Country:
[R]eal self-determination has not been—and cannot be—
achieved until tribes can determine for themselves what is
right and what is wrong on their own reservations … [i]n
the absence of this power, Indian people must conform their
actions to rules and value judgments imposed on them by
outsiders. Such a scheme is a tremendous obstacle to true

self-determination. … Increasing meaningful tribal self-determination almost necessarily requires restoring a greater
measure of tribal autonomy and reducing federal control on
Indian reservations.4
The legacy and history of federal Indian policy and federal policy
toward energy resource development in Indian Country, the potential
wealth of energy resources on tribal lands, the pressing need for economic development in Indian Country, and the impacts of the federal
oversight and approval are all factors that have brought this conflict
to the forefront in the field of energy development on tribal lands.

Challenges Presented by the History of Federal Indian Policy
Like many resource-based issues in Indian Country, the legacy of the
late 19th- and early 20th-century federal Allotment Era remains a
challenge for energy development on tribal lands. The allotment of
tribal lands resulted in tribes losing more than 90 million acres (an
area about the size of Montana) and resulted in fractured ownership
patterns of both the surface and subsurface estates on the remaining
lands. In the century since allotment, these various interests have
been further fractionated through their devise and descent over
subsequent generations, and, more recently, both tribes and the
federal government have worked to reacquire and consolidate these
interests under tribal ownership. Nonetheless, on many reservations,
allotment, non-Indian homesteading, and the passage of time have
resulted in a checkerboard of surface and subsurface ownership.
As a result, nontribal lands within a tribe’s reservation may be more
attractive for development, because those lands are not subject to
federal oversight like tribal lands. This competitive disadvantage has
motivated many tribes to seek a more level playing field for development of their own resources.5
In addition to the legacy of allotment, the history of federal–
tribal relations plays a role in the current discussion over the
federal–tribal relationship in energy development. Professor
Judith Royster has aptly described federal policy toward energy

April 2016 • THE FEDERAL LAWYER • 51

development in Indian Country as a “microcosm of the history of
federal–tribal relations during the last century.”6 Like those broad
policies, the development of minerals and energy resources from
tribal lands has evolved from an area of extensive federal control to
one more balanced between tribal authority and federal oversight,
although federal oversight remains.
The first comprehensive federal effort to address development
in Indian Country came at the close of the allotment period and,
consistent with overarching federal policy at the time, represented
an attempt to spur tribal governance and economic development.
To do so, the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 396a-396g, put tribes in the position of lessors of tribal minerals
and required tribal consent, subject to the approval of the secretary
of the Interior, for each mineral lease. Despite this statutory commitment to tribal authority, however, the role of the federal government, largely through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), remained
pervasive, and, aside from a tribe’s consent to leasing, the federal
government largely controlled the details of the lease negotiation
process for decades after the passage of the IMLA.

that, unless tribes are authorized “… to assume final approval authority over transactions involving trust lands, economic progress in
Indian Country will continue to be hindered by the trust.”10 The need
for federal approval of leases and agreements under the IMLA and
IMDA—a requirement rooted in the federal trust responsibility—and
the costs, burdens, and delays caused by that approval process have
motivated tribes, particularly those with advanced governance and
technical capabilities, to reconsider whether the current iteration of
the trust relationship actually serves their best interests.

Indian Country’s Energy Potential
The energy resource potential of Indian lands is also a driving factor
behind the ongoing discussion of new approaches to energy development in Indian Country. Tribal lands offer significant opportunities
for renewable and nonrenewable energy development. For example,
according to a Department of Energy study, although tribal lands account for only 2 percent of the nation’s land base, they offer an estimated 5 percent of all of the nation’s renewable energy resources. Of
these resources, tribal solar energy potential amounts to 5.1 percent

Thus, under both the IMLA and the IMDA, some form of federal approval is
required for most every potential development project on tribal land. This
requirement, rooted in the federal government’s trust responsibility to protect
tribes and their best interests, inherently conflicts with tribal autonomy over
such projects and, by involving the federal bureaucracy in the review and
approval process for each such project, often results in delays.

Nearly 50 years later and largely in response to tribal frustration
with their inability to exercise greater control and flexibility over
resource development on their lands, Congress passed the 1982
Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108.
Unlike the IMLA, which authorized only leases of tribal minerals,
IMDA allowed tribes to negotiate and enter a variety of arrangements
for mineral development, including a “joint venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement …”7
The IMDA still mandated approval by the secretary of the Interior
for each such agreement, however, and, in light of the greater risk
of potential loss associated with a broader range of agreements,
also provided that “the United States shall not be liable for losses
sustained by a tribe” as a result of a mineral agreement.8
Thus, under both the IMLA and the IMDA, some form of federal
approval is required for most every potential development project
on tribal land. This requirement, rooted in the federal government’s trust responsibility to protect tribes and their best interests,
inherently conflicts with tribal autonomy over such projects and, by
involving the federal bureaucracy in the review and approval process
for each such project, often results in delays.9 Both the structure and
the poor federal administration of the trust relationship prompted
former Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Gover to assert
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of the nation’s overall generation potential, while wind resources are
approximately 3.4 percent of the total national technical potential.11
Tribal lands also contain an enormous amount of traditional energy
resources, including estimates of up to 5.3 billion barrels of oil, 37.9
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53.7 billion tons of recoverable
coal potential.12

Need for Economic Development
The potential for energy development in Indian Country can perhaps
only be matched by the need for successful and sustainable job
creation and long-term tribal economic development. While some
tribes have been able to capitalize on their resources, many in Indian
Country still face grinding poverty and related social ills, while tribal
governments rely heavily on federal funding to provide programs and
services for their members.
The need for sustainable economic development in Indian Country combined with the substantial potential of tribal energy resources
has led many to question why tribes are not better able to take advantage of their own energy resources. In fact, these questions have
generated substantial bipartisan congressional attention in recent
years, particularly among members of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. Most recently, the chairman of that committee, Sen. John

Barrasso (R-Wyo.), commissioned the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to study the barriers to tribal energy development.

2015 GAO Report on Energy Development on Indian Lands
The GAO’s report, “Poor Management by BIA Has Hindered Energy
Development on Indian Lands,” was issued in June 2015 and documented a number of missed development opportunities, lost revenue,
and threatened projects across tribal lands.13 According to the GAO’s
analysis, many of the challenges to these projects were caused by or
at least significantly due to delays in the federal review and approval
process for the project documents. According to the GAO, the factors
contributing to these delays were numerous and included administrative issues within the BIA, such as a lack of accurate data (compounded by the complex land ownership patterns resulting from allotment),
staff limitations, and the absence of any system for tracking of review
and response times on the part of the federal agency. The report also
blamed the complex regulatory framework associated with federal
review and approval of proposed projects on tribal lands, including
review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), applicability of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA), and the involvement of both the BIA and
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as well as other federal agencies. In addition to these predominantly federal issues, the report also
noted other challenges, such as the dual taxation of tribal projects,
and tribal-specific issues, such as a challenging capital market, lack of
infrastructure, and tribal capacity. The GAO report confirmed many
tribal concerns with the federal role in energy development and underscored the issues on which recent proposals for promoting energy
development in Indian Country focus.
The GAO report also addressed a separate but related topic
that has prompted the move for reform. In addition to studying the
impediments to tribal development, Barrasso also asked the GAO to
study why no tribe had yet entered into a Tribal Energy Resource
Agreement (TERA) pursuant to provisions of Title V of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, also known as the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSDA), codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3506. TERAs were intended to enhance and empower
tribes to approve energy-related agreements as a way to ameliorate
many of the issues found by the GAO’s review. In fact, all of the
same factors that are driving the current discussion of tribal energy
development also motivated the enactment of the ITEDSDA in 2005.
In addition, the more recent Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership (HEARTH) Act, enacted in 2012 and
codified in relevant part at 25 U.S.C. §415(h), sought to ameliorate
the same issues as they relate to leasing tribal surface lands, including for solar and wind projects. Though each of these reforms has its
own shortcomings, they are worthy of review, because they inform
the most recent proposals for reform.

A Decade of New Approaches? TERAs and the HEARTH Act
TERAs were intended to usher in the beginning of a new approach to tribal self-determination and potentially a new era in the
federal–tribal relationship. Once negotiated between a tribe and
the secretary of the Interior, a TERA would authorize the tribe to
review and approve energy-related leases, business agreements,
and rights-of-way for projects on tribal lands without the need for
federal approval of each individual lease, agreement, or right-ofway. In doing so, TERAs changed the balance of the federal–tribal

relationship by empowering tribes to exercise decision-making
authority over their own resources without federal oversight of
each such decision. Ideally, this tribal authority in lieu of federal
oversight would significantly minimize, if not eliminate, the problems associated with mismanagement by the BIA identified by the
GAO in its 2015 report.
But, as is the case with other recent efforts to promote tribal
authority, such empowerment came with conditions, many of which
have been identified by tribes, scholars, and the GAO as disincentives for tribes to seek a TERA.14 These issues include the requirement that, as part of a TERA, a tribe must provide an environmental
review process allowing for public (including nontribal) review and
comment on proposed leases, agreements, and rights-of-way. In addition, much like under IMDA, the federal government would be liable
neither for “any negotiated term” of any such agreement, lease, or
right-of-way approved by a tribe nor any losses therefrom, although
this waiver presumably allows for liability that may result from other
sources, such as non-negotiated terms of such agreements. The GAO
also identified that tribes considering a TERA have been uncertain
over the amount of authority for which they could actually negotiate, as the regulations implementing ITEDSDA allowed tribes to
assume “activities normally carried out by the Department [of the
Interior] except for inherently Federal functions.”15 This regulatory
restriction came without definition of what might be considered an
“inherently Federal function” and, therefore, left tribes guessing as
to the potential scope of a TERA. The GAO also noted that tribes
were concerned that their assumption of additional responsibilities
under a TERA would come with no additional federal funding. Lastly,
the ITEDSDA required the secretary of the Interior to determine the
capacity of an applicant tribe to carry out the functions of a TERA—
and the process for rendering that determination, along with the
complex TERA application process, have also been disincentives to
tribal participation. Thus, the promise of a new, more tribal sovereignty-oriented dynamic embodied by TERAs has not yet come to
pass, leading some to question whether the TERA model is the right
model for the future.16
Unlike the ITEDSDA, as of November 2015, some two dozen
Indian tribes have taken advantage of the provisions of the HEARTH
Act, which, like TERAs, authorize greater tribal authority and control
over tribal lands. The foundational concepts underlying the HEARTH
Act were first articulated in legislative amendments that authorized
specific tribes, like the Navajo Nation, to lease their surface lands
without the need for secretarial approval of each lease. Like those
early tribal-specific models, under the HEARTH Act, tribes can now
submit proposed leasing regulations to the secretary for approval
and—provided the regulations are “consistent with” federal leasing
regulations and include a tribal environmental review process similar
to that required in a TERA—the secretary can approve the regulations and authorize a tribe to approve individual leases in accordance
with those tribal rules. The HEARTH Act is limited, however, to surface leasing, which includes leases for business purposes, like solar,
wind, and biomass development projects, but does not authorize tribal subsurface leasing or the granting of rights-of-way. In addition, the
HEARTH Act waives the liability of the United States for any “losses
sustained by any party to a lease” approved by a tribe pursuant to
that tribe’s regulations. This waiver of federal liability is broader than
the waiver under a TERA, which is limited to waiving liability that
flows only from a “negotiated term” of an agreement.
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From enactment of the HEARTH Act in 2012 to November
2015, some 20 tribes have obtained secretarial approval of their
tribal business leasing regulations. Even so, however, the GAO
report found that, as of March 2015, only one utility-scale wind facility is in operation on tribal land, with one more such facility and
one utility-scale solar facility under construction. By comparison,
since 2005, 686 utility-scale wind projects and 778 utility-scale
solar projects have been constructed on nontribal lands.17 In addition, many of the same concerns that have been expressed about
TERAs, such as the required environmental review process and
waiver of federal liability, are equally applicable to the HEARTH
Act.18 Lastly, the HEARTH Act does not provide a tribe with
comprehensive authority to pursue energy development, as it
addresses only surface leasing authority and does not allow tribes
to approve rights-of-way that might be necessary and incidental
to such surface development.
Therefore, although recent attempts to reform and enhance the
authority of tribes to develop their own energy resources began
as early as the 2005 passage of ITEDSDA, the 2015 GAO report
indicated significant impediments to such development remain.
According to the GAO, many of those impediments result from the
federal government’s role in the process. Thus, the appropriate

Administration Proposals
The GAO report included specific recommendations for executive
action on the part of the BIA to address the administrative issues
identified in the report. These recommendations included improving
BIA’s ability to determine ownership, collect data, and track review
and response times, as well as providing additional guidance regarding “inherently Federal functions” and improving the efficacy of the
agency’s grant programs.19 While these recommendations focus on
specific aspects of the BIA’s administrative management of the federal trust responsibility, officials who oversee BIA’s functions within
the Department of the Interior have also offered some proposals for
broader reform.
In written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs for an oversight hearing on the GAO report before that committee, Larry Roberts, now acting assistant secretary of Indian Affairs,
highlighted the agency’s efforts to “break[ ] down the silos that create
obstacles to close coordination in the federal bureaucracy …” and
proposed to continue that effort through the development of an Indian
Energy Service Center.20 The service center is proposed in Obama’s
2016 budget and, according to Roberts’ testimony, would consolidate
federal resources, such as BIA, BLM, trust officers, and others, in
one location “to maintain a responsive, administrative and technical

In addition to studying the impediments to tribal development, Barrasso also
asked the GAO to study why no tribe had yet entered into a Tribal Energy Resource
Agreement (TERA) pursuant to provisions of Title V of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
also known as the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act
(ITEDSDA), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506. TERAs were intended to enhance
and empower tribes to approve energy-related agreements as a way to ameliorate
many of the issues found by the GAO’s review.

balance between the federal trust responsibility and tribal self-determination is central to alleviating the challenges to tribal energy
development. As a result, a number of the pending proposals could
alter that balance and, potentially, lead to a new era of more meaningful tribal self-determination like that described by Washburn.

Next Stop, True Self-Determination?
The current proposals to address the barriers to tribal energy development are varied in their approaches; some seek to amend specific
parts of existing law by streamlining the present structure, while
others envision entirely new approaches, and still others propose
to apply existing structures in new ways. The current proposals
also range from promoting nearly independent tribal autonomy
(by authorizing a tribe to request that its lands be removed from
federally owned trust status altogether) to seeking improvements in
administration of the current federal trust model. The remainder of
this article reviews each of these proposals in light of its respective
approach to the federal–tribal relationship.
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capacity, that when needed, can bolster local or regional staff faced
with surging workload thus avoiding or eliminating backlogs.”21 Given
the GAO’s findings regarding the BIA’s administrative issues and the
complexity of the underlying federal regulatory process, however, it
remains to be seen whether the service center would ameliorate these
issues or compound them by consolidating them into one location.
Regardless, the service center proposal would not realign the federal
government’s relationship with Indian tribes but, ideally, would streamline the federal role within that relationship.
Beyond streamlining the existing process, Interior officials also
support broader legislative reform that would expand the HEARTH
Act model to allow tribal authority over subsurface leasing. In 2014,
Washburn urged the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to consider
broader application of the HEARTH Act instead of more detailed
amendments to ITEDSDA.22 More recently, Roberts further urged
the committee to consider amending the IMDA to incorporate the
HEARTH Act model.23 In doing so, the department highlighted the
HEARTH Act’s promotion of tribal sovereignty and relative success

in comparison to the lack of tribes that have pursued a TERA. Washburn also indicated Interior’s preference for the broader waiver of the
federal government’s liability under the HEARTH Act as compared
with ITESDA’s narrower waiver for liability related to a “negotiated
term” because, according to Washburn, the latter lacks clarity.24
As discussed in more detail below, although Interior officials
prefer the HEARTH Act over the TERA model, Washburn has also
recognized that expanding the HEARTH Act from surface leasing
to subsurface mineral leasing and development presents a complex
challenge. For example, while tribal surface leasing regulations
under the HEARTH Act must be consistent with a single and fairly
straightforward body of federal regulations, the IMLA and the IMDA
each have their own separate and far more detailed regulatory
schemes.25 Therefore, while the HEARTH Act model has also found
some support in pending congressional legislation, those bills have
not yet been consistent with the department’s position and include
additional provisions that either support the TERA model or raise
other objections from the Obama administration.

S. 209, ITEDSA Amendments of 2015
Reintroduced in the 114th Congress by Barrasso and based on similar proposals in each of the last three Congresses, S. 209, the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2015, aims to address many of the TERA-related issues
identified in the 2015 GAO report. For example, the bill would provide additional funding for tribes seeking to develop capacity to enter
a TERA and ease the secretary’s standards for determining whether
a tribe has sufficient capacity. Under this legislation, a tribe would
only need to demonstrate successful management of a relevant
self-determination contract to meet the capacity threshold to enter a
TERA. Likewise, the bill would confine the TERA approval process to
an established timeframe and limit the secretary’s ability to decline
a TERA. Importantly, the bill also confirms that ITEDSDA does not
waive any federal liability beyond that resulting from a “negotiated
term” of an agreement approved by a tribe under a TERA, meaning
that the United States could be liable under actions arising outside of
the negotiated terms of an agreement. The bill also expands the coverage of a potential TERA to include a broader range of agreements,
including communitization and pooling agreements. As passed by the
Senate, the legislation also includes a number of non-ITEDSA-related
provisions, including (1) authorizing tribal biomass demonstration
and weatherization projects; (2) relaxing the federal appraisal
requirements for energy-related projects; and (3) expanding the Navajo Nation’s leasing authority to include the approval mineral leases
of up to 25 years without secretarial approval.
S. 209 is focused on improving the TERA-model and fixing the
issues identified by the GAO as disincentives for tribes considering
a TERA. As such, the bill primarily recommits to the TERA model
as the path forward for the federal–tribal relationship in the field of
energy development. It remains to be seen whether, if enacted, the
revisions to the TERA standards and process contained in S. 209
would be sufficient to overcome the challenges that have led many to
consider the TERA approach a failure.
Of S. 209’s non-TERA-focused provisions, the expansion of
Navajo Nation leasing authority to subsurface resources also lends
support to the HEARTH Act model but not in the same manner
envisioned by the Department of the Interior. Just as the HEARTH
Act’s roots began with expansion of surface leasing authority on a

tribe-by-tribe basis (and the Navajo Nation was one of the first tribes
to assume such authority), the proposal to expand Navajo leasing
authority to subsurface resources could be a precursor to expanding
the HEARTH Act beyond surface leasing.
Unlike the most recent proposal from Roberts to amend IMDA to
incorporate concepts from the HEARTH Act, however, S. 209 proposes to incorporate subsurface leasing into the Navajo Nation’s existing leasing authority by amending 25 U.S.C. § 415(e)(1) to include
tribal authority to approve “lease[s] for the exploration, development,
or extraction of any mineral resource,” provided the Nation’s leasing
regulations have been approved by the secretary of the Interior.26
When questioned about this proposal in an earlier version of S. 209,
Washburn indicated that the department had some concerns because
“mineral development is more complicated than business site leases
… or surface leases … [and] … there are some slight differences in
the way the HEARTH Act works and the way energy leasing needs
to work.”27 Thus, if S. 209 were enacted, it remains unclear whether
and how the Department of the Interior would review and approve
mineral leasing regulations proposed by the Navajo Nation.
Ultimately, expansion of the HEARTH Act model to subsurface
development, whether through the Navajo Nation proposal in S. 209
or the IMDA amendment proposal of the Department of the Interior,
is complicated by the differences between surface and subsurface
leasing. Washburn recognized these differences in commenting on
the Navajo Nation proposal, and the GAO report’s description of the
complex regulatory scheme applicable to energy development on
tribal lands further highlights the potential challenges of marrying
the HEARTH Act with mineral development. And, notwithstanding
the 20 tribes that have taken advantage of the HEARTH Act for
surface leasing, the Act’s waiver of federal liability and required environmental review process may deter tribes from pursuing authority
for subsurface leasing, as evidenced by apparent tribal reluctance
toward TERAs based in part on related concerns. Therefore, while
supported in some form by the Obama administration and proposed
in Congress, expansion of the HEARTH Act to subsurface development will likely require significant additional analysis and consideration before becoming a reality. Even so, a bill including a provision
like that of S. 209 that would expand HEARTH Act-like authority
for subsurface leasing to the Navajo Nation has already passed the
House, although its chances of success are likely doomed by its other
provisions that would restrict the applicability of other federal laws
and rules to energy-related projects on tribal lands.

H.R. 538, Native American Energy Act
H.R. 538, the Native American Energy Act, was introduced by Rep.
Don Young (R-Ark.), chair of the House Subcommittee on Indian,
Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs, to address a variety of issues
related to tribal energy development. Like S. 209, H.R. 538 includes
provisions addressing appraisals and authorizing an expansion of
leasing authority for the Navajo Nation. This bill would also limit
NEPA and judicial review of energy-related projects on tribal lands
and, absent tribal consent, would prohibit the application of the
BLM’s recently promulgated rule regarding hydraulic fracturing on
tribal land. Thus, aside from promoting the possible expansion of the
HEARTH Act model for subsurface leasing at the Navajo Nation, this
bill primarily focuses on minimizing the existing federal review and
approval process and potential for legal challenges to tribal projects
rather than rebalancing federal and tribal responsibilities. Although
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the bill passed the House, Obama, expressing displeasure with the
bill’s limits on NEPA, judicial review, and the BLM’s rule regarding
hydraulic fracturing, issued a Statement of Administration Policy
opposing the bill.28 Thus, H.R. 538 is unlikely to become law in its
current form, but, given the inclusion of a few provisions also found
in S. 209, it seems possible that a compromise measure could have
some prospect of success, provided the political divide between the
Obama administration and Rep. Young allows room for compromise.

H.R. 328, American Indian Empowerment Act
Another potentially controversial measure, also introduced by Young,
awaits further consideration in the House. H.R. 328, the American
Indian Empowerment Act, would authorize an Indian tribe to request
that lands held by the federal government in trust for its benefit be
transferred to the tribe in restricted fee status. According to the
bill, once transferred, the lands would retain their Indian Country
status as well as restrictions on alienability and taxation, but a tribe
would be able to approve leases and rights-of-way across such lands
without the need for federal approval. In addition, tribal law would
preempt federal laws and regulations on such lands provided, however, the tribal laws had first been published in the Federal Register.
Notwithstanding the authority for a tribe to seek the withdrawal of
its lands from trust status, the final section of the bill makes clear
that nothing in the bill should be construed to diminish the federal
government’s trust responsibilities. The legislation does not specify
the scope of those trust responsibilities for a tribe that elects to
withdraw its lands from trust status. Thus, although the American
Indian Empowerment Act presents the potential for enhanced tribal
decision-making authority and self-determination over tribal lands,
the removal of those lands from trust status and uncertainty over the
resulting obligations of the federal government have raised for some
the specter of the termination era of the 1950s, during which the
federal government sought to end entirely its trust relationship with
Indian tribes.29 In response to these concerns, Young has sought to
emphasize that he intended the legislation to begin a discussion on
how federal policy can move toward increased tribal self-determination.30 Nevertheless, aside from a 2012 subcommittee hearing on H.R.
328’s predecessor, this proposal has not advanced in Congress.

S. 383, Indian Trust Asset Reform Act (also H.R. 812)
An additional intriguing opportunity for promotion of tribal self-determination does not expressly focus on tribal energy development
at all. Rather, S. 383 (and its House companion H.R. 812), the Indian
Trust Asset Reform Act, addresses trust assets more broadly, but its
proposed expansion of tribal responsibility for those assets, potentially including surface and subsurface trust resources, has particular
relevance in the context of energy development and in comparison
to the existing TERA and HEARTH Act models.
As a starting point, the bill would reaffirm the trust responsibility
to “include a duty to promote tribal self-determination regarding
governmental authority and economic development.” In furtherance
of that policy, Title II of the bill authorizes “trust asset management
demonstration project[s],” which would allow a tribe to request and
assume responsibility for the management of trust assets, including the authority to approve surface leasing or forest management
agreements without secretarial review and approval in a manner
consistent with existing statutory authority under the HEARTH Act
(for surface leasing) or the National Indian Forest Management Act
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(NIFRMA) (for forest management agreements).31
In order to enter such a demonstration project, a tribe would
have to petition the secretary and develop a trust asset management plan, which must include a description of the trust assets to
be managed, the tribal management objectives and priorities for
those assets, funding sources, and dispute resolution mechanisms.
In addition, the proposed plan need not be consistent with federal
regulations but must “identify any Federal regulations that will be
superseded by the plan.”32 Unlike the complicated and confusing
capacity and application requirements for entering a TERA, the secretary must approve a trust asset management plan unless the plan
(1) is inconsistent with the existing “treaties, statutes, Executive
orders, and court decisions” applicable to the relevant trust assets or
their management; (2) does not include one of the required components described above; or (3) will result in implementation costs that
exceed available funding.33
With respect to the potential liability of the federal government,
the bill confirms that neither the liability of the federal government
nor that of an Indian tribe would be “independently diminish[ed],
increase[d], create[d] or otherwise affect[ed]” by the legislation or by
a trust asset management plan. Importantly, however, for trust assets
managed by a tribe pursuant to a trust asset management plan, the
bill would waive federal liability for losses that may result from a
term of the plan that “provides for management” of the trust asset
at a “less-stringent standard than the Secretary would otherwise
require or adhere to in absence of an Indian trust asset management
plan.” This provision is remarkable in two respects. First, the waiver
of federal liability is quite narrow but prompts due consideration of
the risks associated with managing trust assets differently than the
federal government. Second and perhaps more revolutionary, the
provision recognizes that, although trust asset management must be
consistent with broader applicable law, a tribe may decide to manage
a trust asset differently than the federal government and may do so
at a “less stringent standard.”34
Although the current version of S. 383 does not authorize tribes
to independently approve a lease or agreement unless done in
accordance with the HEARTH Act, the bill would authorize a tribe
to manage its own trust assets as the tribe sees fit, notwithstanding
otherwise applicable federal regulations and even if federal management standards under those regulations would be more stringent.
That recognition of tribal authority marks a step away from the notion
that, in order to exercise authority over trust resources, tribes must
conform to federal regulatory standards. Under the HEARTH Act, for
example, tribal leasing regulations must be “consistent with” federal
regulations. Similarly, the regulations implementing a TERA left uncertainty over what constitutes an “inherent Federal function” and, by
doing so, potentially limited tribal authority under a TERA to activities
that do not require the federal (i.e., more stringent) protection of
tribal trust resources. As one tribal leader stated in written testimony
discussing S. 383 in the context of a Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs hearing on trust modernization: “Unlike existing legal authorities that authorize tribes to contract or compact federal functions
under federal standards, this demonstration project is unique in that it
would provide participating tribes the freedom to determine how their
resources will be managed under tribal standards.”35 This small step,
along with the legislation’s express affirmation that the trust responsibility includes supporting tribal self-determination for economic
development purposes, could be a significant starting point for a new

approach to tribal self-determination that
would allow for greater tribal authority and
flexibility in the management of trust assets,
including surface and potentially subsurface
resources for energy development.

Conclusion
A number of factors continue to motivate
the ongoing discussion of federal trust
responsibility and tribal self-determination
in the area of tribal energy development.
The June 2015 GAO report described herein
drew additional attention from Congress,
interested tribes, and officials of the Obama
administration. The future of energy
development on tribal lands depends on
whether this additional focus will result in
broader support for a particular approach
to addressing the issues identified by the
GAO, many of which stem from the balance
between tribal self-determination and the
federal trust responsibility. As described
above, the current proposals represent a
broad range of perspectives on the future
of self-determination and federal oversight,
from maintaining the current tribal-federal
relationship and working to improve the
federal review and approval process to
allowing each tribe to decide whether to
remove tribal trust lands from federal ownership. Between these extremes lie proposals to expand or improve
the existing TERA or HEARTH Act models, each of which presents
its own complications. In addition, the Indian Trust Asset Reform
Act proposes a recommitment of the federal trust responsibility but
emphasizes the promotion of tribal self-determination for governmental authority and economic development, not just the federal
protection and oversight of tribal resources. This commitment, along
with the recognition that each tribe is in the best position to decide
how to manage its own trust resources and may do so differently
than the federal government, could help redefine the federal–tribal
relationship in energy development and beyond. Ultimately, a new
era of tribal self-determination appears just over the horizon, and,
although the precise path from the current crossroads to that new
era is presently unclear, it will most likely incorporate the concepts
currently being debated in the context of energy development on
tribal lands. 
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